This paper provides a normative framework to assess social welfare within a rankdependent and bidimensional setting where individuals are characterized by income and needs. In line with the growing interest in top incomes and inequalities concerning the upper part of the income distribution (see Atkinson and Piketty, 2007, 2010; Aaberge, Havnes and Mogstad, 2013) , we propose a complete framework to rank bidimensional distributions, by focussing on inequalities among the poorest as well as the richest individuals, both in the monetary and non-monetary dimension. To this end, we develop third degree inverse stochastic dominance conditions for classes of social welfare functions satisfying: i) downside inequality aversion with respect to income and upside inequality aversion with respect to needs; ii) upside inequality aversion with respect to income and downside inequality aversion with respect to needs; iii) upside inequality aversion both with respect to income and needs. Our results emerge along with the existing one, formulated by Zoli (2000), supporting downside inequality aversion both with respect to income and needs.
Introduction
Since the pioneering contribution of Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) , sequential stochastic dominance techniques have become a widely accepted criterion for ranking income distributions of populations decomposed into subgroups of individuals homogeneous in needs.
Such techniques take into account the multidimensional nature of well-being and social welfare and allow to rank di¤erent distributions by including both the monetary and some non-monetary attribute characterizing the populations under scrutiny. In particular, the authors depart from the unanimous preference expressed by an additively separable social welfare function of the utilitarian type. By imposing certain conditions on the derivatives of the utility function, they obtain di¤erent classes of SWFs encompassing some socially desirable properties. For each class of SWFs introduced, it is possible to assess welfare dominance by means of readily implementable tests, namely …rst and second order sequential stochastic dominance conditions. The usefulness of this framework paves the way to a fertile strand of research, whose applications may be distinguished considering whether they adopt the utilitarian or rank-dependent representation of social preferences. In particular, as far as the utilitarian framework is concerned, Jenkins and Lambert (1993) However, recent developments in the inequality literature are raising a growing interest in top incomes and the evolution of inequalities concerning the upper part of the income distribution (see Atkinson and Piketty, 2007; 2010) , leading the researchers to reconsider their standard attitude towards downside inequality aversion, which is encompassed by a social welfare function satisfying the principle of diminishing trasfer within the utilitarian approach, and the principle of downside positional transfer sensitivity within the rank-dependent setting. In this vein, Aaberge (2009) In the present work, we draw togeher the arguments introduced above, namely the concern for the multidimensional evaluation of social welfare and the interest in inequalities a¤ecting the top of the distribution. To this end, we develop third-degree inverse stochastic dominance conditions suitable for a rank-dependent and bidimensional framework and able to encompass di¤erent attitudes towards inequality aversion. In particular, a greater attention may be devoted to inequalities arising among the poorest as well as the richest individuals of the population, both in a monetary and a non-monetary sense. To be more precise, we develop third degree inverse dominance conditions for classes of social welfare functions satisfying: i) downside inequality aversion with respect to income and upside inequality aversion with respect to needs; ii) upside inequality aversion with respect to income and downside inequality aversion with respect to needs; iii) upside inequality aversion both with respect to income and needs.
These results emerge along with the existing one, formulated by Zoli (2000) , supporting downside inequality aversion both with respect to income and needs.
Notice that in all these cases the standard Pigou-Dalton transfer principle is preserved, what di¤ers from one approach to the other is whether one puts more emphasis on di¤er-ences among the richest or the poorest individuals, having in mind that, within our setting, each individual is characterized by a monetary and a non-monetary attribute.
A remark is in order at this point. The standard practise adopted in sequential dominance tests consists in dividing the population into subgroups depending on family size, age, type of housing. However, as noted by Duclos and Échevin (2009) , the method may also cover cases where this information is replaced by any other ordinal variable. Hence, also the framework we analyze can be naturally extended in order to consider individuals di¤ering in some non-income dimension such as health, education and so on. However, throughout the paper, we use the generic term "needs", having in mind that it has a quite ‡exible and wide content.
This contribution represents an additional instrument in the researcher's toolbox to help evaluating di¤erent distributions of income and needs, in particular when there is interest in embracing not only the traditional view of giving higher weight to inequalities at the bottom of the distribution, but also the more recent one of looking at the top of it.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the framework, Section 3 presents the theoretical results, Section 4 concludes.
Theoretical model 2.1 Notation
Let individuals s, belonging to population S, be described by an income level y and by an additional non-monetary dimension of well-being, that we indicate with the generic term "needs". Consider the population S as partitioned into groups S i , i = 1; :::; n, characterized by a decreasing level of these needs, in such a way that we can consider group i to be needier and consequently poorer in a non-monetary sense than group i + 1. We assume that the needs'level of individuals gives an extra information about their identity to be read together with the traditional information about monetary incomes. If F i (y) is the cumulative income distribution of group i and we denote by q F i the share of individuals belonging to group i, we have that the overall cumulative income distribution is
be the mean income of distribution F . Moreover, let z be the set of all such cumulative distributions and F We are interested in a formulation of the rank-dependent social welfare function that is able to capture not only the extent of monetary wealth, but also its non-monetary side, proxied by the membership of individuals to di¤erent needs-based groups. According to this idea, a rank-dependent needs-based SWF could be expressed by:
where v i (p) is the weight attached to the income of an individual ranked at the p th percentile in group i, which we assume to be a continuous and twice di¤erentiable function.
It is clear that the aggregation of incomes encompasses two di¤erent weighting procedures: on the one hand, within each group, a weighted average of the incomes of individuals is obtained on the basis of the their position in the income ranking; on the other hand, incomes of each group, weighted by the relevant population share, are aggregated according to weights that are speci…c for each group.
Restrictions on weights will de…ne di¤erent classes of social welfare functions, characterized by di¤erent normative implications.
Properties
In this section, we discuss di¤erent restrictions on the weight function. By imposing a greater number of such restrictions, although we make stricter assumptions about the properties of the social welfare function, we will be able to perform more comparisons between intersecting distribution functions.
Each property on the set of weights will be explained and justi…ed by means of various re…nements of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. First of all, we impose a standard monotonicity assumption, requiring that social welfare is a nondecreasing function of individuals'incomes. This amounts to specifying nonnegative weights. We are interested in a welfare representation that gives priority to individuals exhibiting higher needs, that is, if two individuals belonging to di¤erent needs groups are ranked at the same percentile in the income distribution of their respective group, the social planner should give higher weight to the income of the needier individual.
A class of social welfare functions satisfying both Properties 1 and 2 displays weights such that: This property corresponds to the standard principle of transfers applied over homogeneous populations. In particular, we restrict our attention to individuals belonging to the same group, i.e. characterized by the same level of needs. The social planner should display inequality aversion, thus evaluating more a distribution where the incomes of individuals of the same group are more equal. In fact, imposing negative …rst derivatives on the weight function v i (p) is equivalent to impose that a progressive income transfer from indviduals belonging to group i and ranked at the (p + ) th percentile of the income distribution to individuals of the same group i but ranked at the p th income percentile, with 0, is welfare enhancing (see Mehran, 1976 and Yaari, 1987 , 1988 . This property states that the same progressive transfer of income is evaluated di¤erently if it takes place in di¤erent needs groups. Namely, W increases more, the higher is the needs level of the group, within which the progressive transfer takes place. Following Zoli (2000), we consider two identical progressive transfers > 0 from individuals ranked at the (p + ) th percentile of the income distribution to individuals belonging to the same group, but ranked at the p th income percentile, with 0. These transfers take place within two di¤erent groups: the former is within group i, while the latter is within group i + 1, that is less needy. W obeys the principle of inequality aversion between groups if the impact on social welfare of the transfer within group i is greater than the impact of the same transfer applied to group i + 1, that is:
i+1 W (p; ; ) f or any p; ; ; i which corresponds to:
f or any p; ; ; i
Simplifying for , it becomes:
that is equivalent to:
f or any p; ; i which for small becomes:
Properties 3 and 4, taken together, require that: To better understand the meaning of the DPTS, consider a …xed progressive transfer taking place between individuals belonging to group i and showing equal di¤erence in ranks, but located in di¤erent positions within their group's distribution. We require the transfer taking place at lower ranks to be more equalizing, and thus more welfare improving, than the transfer taking place at higher ranks. In particular, we consider two progressive transfers -within group i -of the same amount, , one from individuals at rank q + to individuals at rank q, and another from rank p + to rank p, with q p and expressing the equal di¤erence in ranks, and denote the change in social welfare associated with them, rispectively, by i W (q; ; ) and i W (p; ; ). W satis…es the DPTS if and only if i W (q; ; ) i W (p; ; ) f or all q p, where p = q + ". In formal terms, this means that:
f or any p; ; ; i which is equivalent to:
Hence, we may interpret this condition as the requirement that a combination of a progressive and a regressive transfer of the same amount but taking place respectively from the (q + ) th to the q th percentile and from the p th to the (p + ) th percentile of the income distribution, with q p, does not lead to a welfare loss. Such combination has been called in Zoli (1999) an "Elementary Favorable Composite Positional Transfer" (EFCPT). In this context, it will be useful to refer to is as an "Elementary Downside
Favorable Composite Positional Transfer" (EDFCPT), in order to distinguish it form its
Upside counterpart.
We now proceed by re…ning the above expression in order to obtain a condition in terms of the weight function.
In particular, simplifying for , we get that:
which, for small enough, becomes:
Having in mind that p = q + ", this could be written as:
that for small " is equivalent to:
Therefore, in terms of the weight function, the principle of within-group downside positional transfer sensitivity is equivalent to impose positive second derivatives, namely: We con…ne again our attention to intra-group comparisons and exploit the results, due to Aaberge, Havnes and Mogstad (2013), referred to homogeneous populations. The principle of upside positional transfer sensitivity (UPTS) states that the same progressive transfer from a richer to a poorer individual, with a …xed number of peolple between the donor and the receiver, is valued more if it occurs at higher income levels. Clearly, an inequality averse social planner who supports the principle of UPTS can be said to exhibit upside (positional) inequality aversion with respect to income.
To better understand the meaning of the UPTS, consider a …xed progressive transfer taking place between individuals with equal di¤erence in ranks. We require the transfer taking place at lower ranks to be less equalizing, and thus less welfare improving, than the transfer taking place at higher ranks. The normative ground of this principle has to be found in the growing interest, arising among researchers, in the inequalities characterizing the incomes placed at the top of the distribution (see e.g. Atkinson and Piketty, 2007, 2010 ).
We consider two progressive transfers -within group i -of the same amount, , one from an individual at rank q + to an individual at rank q, and another from rank p + to rank p, with p q and expressing the equal di¤erence in ranks, and denote the change in social welfare associated with them, rispectively, by i W (q; ; ) and i W (p; ; ). W satis…es the UPTS if and only if i W (q; ; ) i W (p; ; ) f or all q p, with p = q + ". In formal terms, this means that:
Hence, we may interpret this condition as the requirement that a combination of a progressive and a regressive transfer of the same amount ; but taking place respectively from the (p + ) th to the p th percentile and from the q th to the (q + ) th percentile of the income distribution, with p q, does not lead to a welfare loss. In the same fashion as
Zoli (2000), we might call such combination an "Elementary Upside Favorable Composite
Positional Transfer" (EUFCPT).
We now proceed by simplifyng the above expression in order to obtain a condition in terms of the weight function.
Therefore, in terms of the weight function, the principle of within-group upside positional transfer sensitivity is equivalent to impose negative second derivatives, namely:
v 00 i (p) 0 f or any i = 1; :::; n; f or any p 2 [0; 1].
As we said before, such condition has been introduced by Aaberge, Havnes and Mogstad (2013). However, its interpretation in terms of a combination of a progressive transfer at higher ranks and a regressive transfer at lower ranks has not been made explicit so far.
We will exploit it to develop some of the properties listed below, that are speci…c for the bidimensional setting we are analyzing.
It is worth noticing that each one of the two properties we are going to introduce has a twofold interpretation. Speci…cally, depending on whether we consider a EDFCPT or a EUFCPT -thus assuming downside versus upside inequality aversion with respect to income -each property is shown to have a di¤erent interpretation in terms of the transfer sensitivity adopted with respect to needs. Indeed, when we move from an intra-group to an inter-groups evaluation, each one of the principles encompassed by Properties 5 and 6 may be adapted in order to …t in our needs-based framework. This property is coherent with two alternative formulations of the principle of positional transfer sensitivity applied over di¤erent groups.
In the former case, we endorse downside inequality aversion not only with respect to income, by letting Property 5 hold, but also with respect to needs. This means that we give priority to a progressive transfer at lower ranks in the income distribution rather than at higher ranks, thereby imposing that a EDFCPT does not lead to a welfare loss, and require that the welfare e¤ect of the same EDFCPT applied over di¤erent groups, should not be lower the higher is the needs level of the group. To be more precise, we consider two similar EDFCPT that di¤er only in the group within which they are applied, since one of them takes place within group i, whereas the other takes place within a less needy group, i + 1, and impose that the former is more welfare improving than the latter, which means that:
For small , this is equivalent to
f or any p; ; i
For " small enough, we have that: In the latter case, we endorse a completely opposite view, encompassing upside inequality aversion both with respect to income and needs. In particular, the interest in the inequalities a¤ecting the upper part of the distribution would require to devote a greater attention not only to individuals at higher ranks of the income distribution, thus endorsing the view contained in Property 6, but also to groups characterized by a lower level of needs.
In this case, the welfare e¤ect of the same EUFCPT applied over di¤erent groups, should not be lower the lower is the needs level of the group, that is:
or any p; ; i
For small this is equivalent to: Also this property has two di¤erent interpretations, corresponding to two di¤erent attitudes towards inequality aversion. We describe each one of them in turn.
In the …rst case, though being more concerned about inequalities occurring at lower ranks of the income disribution, we may be more sensitive to inequalities occurring in the upper part of the needs distribution. In this case, we give priority to a progressive transfer at lower ranks in the income distribution rather than at higher ranks, hence imposing, according to Property 5, that a EDFCPT does not lead to a welfare loss, but, at the same time, we want such EDFCPT to be more e¤ective the lower is the needs level of the group within which it takes place. In more formal terms, this amounts to imposing that, between two similar EDFCPT taking place respectively within group i and within group i + 1, the former is less welfare improving than the latter, that is:
For small this means that: Alternatively, although we may be interested in upside inequality aversion with respect to the income component, thereby assuming the validity of Property 6, we might still endorse downside inequality aversion with respect to the non-income component, thus requiring that a EUFCPT be more welfare enhancing if applied to needier groups. To say it in other words, this perspective re ‡ects the idea that we give priority to a progressive transfer at higher ranks in the income distribution rather than at lower ranks, hence imposing that a EUFCPT does not lead to a welfare loss, but, at the same time, we want such EUFCPT to be more e¤ective the higher is the needs level of the group within which it takes place. This implies that a EUFCPT has a greater e¤ect if applied to group i rather than group i + 1, that is:
For small this means that: 
Dominance conditions
In this section we present the sequential inverse stochastic dominance conditions for the classes of social welfare functions previously de…ned. The new results of this paper, de…ning di¤erent versions of the third order sequential inverse stochastic dominace, emerge along with the existing sequential dominance tests proposed by Zoli (2000) . 
That is, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for …rst order welfare dominance for social welfare functions belonging to the class W 1 , is a sequential inverse stochastic dominance condition of …rst order. This requires to carry out a comparison between the two distributions F and G of an average of incomes of every subgroup, weighted according to the relative populaton share q i , and sequentially aggregated starting from the neediest group, then adding the following, and so on, until all the subgroups have been aggregated.
Notice that the comparison has to be conducted at every percentile p. Hence the dominance of F on G must hold at every p and every stage k. 
That is, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for second order welfare dominance for social welfare functions belonging to the class W 2 , is a sequential inverse stochastic dominance condition of second order. To interpret this condition, we de…ne the Generalized Lorenz curve for F following the formulation by Gastwirth (1971) :
Thus, we may rewrite i (p) explicitly in terms of inverse distributions to have that:
where GL F i (p) and GL G i (p) corresponds to the Generalized Lorenz curves associated to distributions F and G. Hence, the dominance of F on G for all SWF in W 2 , requiring that: 
That is, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for third order welfare dominance for social welfare functions belonging to the class W 3 , is a sequential upward inverse stochastic dominance condition of third order. In order to check whether such dominance criterion holds, we have to perform two di¤erent tests.
As far as the …rst test is concerned, recall that, generally speaking, GL(1) = . There-
(1) 08k = 1; :::; n means that we have to compare, between the two distributions F and G, the weighted averages of mean incomes of every subgroup, sequentially aggregated starting from the neediest group, then adding the second, and so on, that is
As regards the second test, checking whether
i (p) 08k = 1; :::; n; 8p 2 [0; 1], amounts to comparing, at every percentile p and every stage k of the sequential procedure, the integrated Generalized Lorenz curves of every subgroup, integrated from below, weighted according to the relative population share q i . This could be expressed also as:
Notice that, endorsing dowside inequality aversion both with respect to income and needs, leads us to:
i) integrate Generalized Lorenz curves starting from the poorest income percentile, that is p = 0;
ii) aggregate needs groups in the sequential procedure starting from the neediest one,
Proposition 4 Given two distributions F and 
That is, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for third order welfare dominance for social welfare functions belonging to the class W 3 , is a sequential downward inverse stochastic dominance condition of third order.
Proof. We want to …nd a necessary and su¢ cient condition for
where
2 For the proofs of Propositions 1, 2 and 3, see Zoli (2000) .
In order to prove su¢ ciency, we will make use of Lemma 1, known as Abel's Lemma, that we now state:
w i 0 8k = 1; :::; n. If v 1 ::: v i ::: v n 0, the same condition is su¢ cient for
We now turn to the su¢ ciency proof. First of all, reverse the order of integration and summation in (2) to have
Using integration by parts, we can rewrite (3) as
Simplifying and substituting for i (p) =
Reversing the order of integration and summation in the second part of (5) and integrating by parts again in the second part of (3.5), we can rewrite W as follows
Simplifying and substituting for i (p) = 1 Z p i (q)dq, we get the following expression
By Properties 1 and 2, we can apply Abel's Lemma to get that a su¢ cient condition
(1) 0 8k = 1; :::; n. Moreover, by properties 6 and 8, we can apply Abel's Lemma to get that a su¢ cient condition for
i (p) 0 8k = 1; :::; n; 8p 2 [0; 1]. Now, since W 3 satis…es also properties 3 and 4,
i (p) 0 8k = 1; :::; n; 8p 2 [0; 1] is su¢ cient also for
To show necessity, we follow the same line of reasoning adopted by Palmisano and Peragine (2015) . First of all, we resort to reduction to absurd arguments and make use of and Abel's decomposition, according to which
We can apply Abel's decomposition to equation (7) and rewrite it as follows
i (p)dp (8) Suppose for a contradiction that W 0, but 9 h 2 f1; :::; n 1g and 9 h = n and an interval
..,n 1g , by Lemma 1 in Chambaz and Maurin (1998) we have that
k (p)dp ! < 0 8p 2 I and given that " n (p) 0, by Lemma 1 in Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) we have that
k (p)dp, we have
If we choose R(p) such that R(p) ! 0 for some p 2 [0; 1] nI, we have that:
Furthermore, suppose for a contradiction that there exists some j for which
Given that b Z a R(p)dp < 0 and
Q(p)dp < 0, we can always choose a combination of v i (1) and i (1), or a combination of v 0 i (0) and i (0);for which W < 0, that is a contradiction.
Here again we interpret separately the two parts of Proposition 4. The …rst condition of Proposition 4 is identical to the one that we have introduced before, namely
The second condition is dual to the second part of Proposition 3 insofar as it endorses the opposite view about the integration procedure. In fact, checking whether
08k = 1; :::; n; 8p 2 [0; 1], amounts to comparing, at every percentile p and every stage k of the sequential procedure, the integrated Generalized Lorenz curves of every subgroup, integrated from above, weighted according to the relative population share q i . This is equivalent to:
Therefore, …rst we have to compare the integrated GL, integrated from above, and weighted according to q i , for the neediest group, i = 1, at every p. Then, we have to add the second group, i = 2, and so on, up to the least needy group, i.e. i = n, and perform the same check at every step.
In this case, we are assuming upside inequality aversion with respect to income and downside inequality aversion with respect to needs. This attitude is suitable for a framework in which, in order to check for third order inverse sequential stochastic dominance, we have to:
i) integrate Generalized Lorenz curves starting from the richest income percentile, i.e.
i.e. i = 1.
Proposition 5 Given two distributions F and G 2 z, a su¢ cient condition for W (F ) 
Proof. We want to …nd a su¢ cient condition for
where 
We now turn to the su¢ ciency proof. Reversing the order of integration and summation in the second part of (3.11) and integrating by parts again in the second part of (11), we can rewrite W as follows
Simplifying and substituting for i (p) = p Z 0 i (q)dq, we get the following expression:
Since we assumed that all W 2 W 4 satis…es v 0 i (1) = 0 8i, expression (13) becomes:
By properties 1 and 2, we can apply Abel's Lemma to get that a su¢ cient condition can apply Lemma 2 to get that a su¢ cient condition for that it requires to carry out the sequential procedure starting from the last group rather than from the …rst. Hence, …rst we have to compare the integrated GL, integrated from below, and weighted according to q i , for the least needy group, i = n, at every p. Then, we have to add group i = n 1, and so on, up to the neediest group, i = 1, and perform the same check at every step. This could be expressed also as:
If we endorse downside inequality aversion with respect to income and upside inequality aversion with respect to needs, then we come up with a third order procedure in which we:
ii) aggregate needs groups in the sequential procedure starting from the least needy one, that is i = n.
Proposition 6 Given two distributions F and G 2 z, a su¢ cient condition for W (F ) W (G) 8W 2 W 4 is v 00 i (p) i (p)dp 0 is that to the second test in Proposition 4, except for the fact that it requires to carry out the sequential procedure starting from the last group rather than from the …rst. Hence, …rst we have to compare the integrated GL, integrated from above, and weighted according to q i , for the least needy group, i = n, at every p. Then, we have to add group i = n 1, and so on, up to the neediest group, i = 1, and perform the same check at every step. This could be expressed also as: This is the last possible attitude towards inequality aversion, supporting upside inequality aversion both with respect to income and needs. In this case, to check whether third order inverse sequential stochastic dominance holds, we have to:
i) integrate Generalized Lorenz curves starting from the richest income percentile, i.e. p = 1;
ii) aggregate needs groups in the sequential procedure starting from the least needy one, i.e. i = n.
Concluding remarks
Several contributions in the economic literature show the need to modify the standard framework to rank income distributions, in order to take into account non-income aspects of well-being. At the same time, an increasing interest has been shown for inequalities a¤ecting the upper part of the income distribution. In this context, the choice between upside and downside inequality aversion speci…es whether, in the evaluation of social welfare, one should give priority to equalizing transfers between poorer vis-a-vis richer individuals.
This work represents an attempt to bring together these issues, by introducing upside inequality aversion considerations within a bidimensional evaluation of social welfare. In particular, we adopt a rank-dependent and needs-based social welfare function and develop third order dominance conditions to rank bidimensional distributions when a concern for upside inequality aversion is embedded.
To this end, we propose some properties that our SWF should satisfy. These properties have the common feature of presenting di¤erent formulations of a principle, introduced by Aaberge (2009) and called upside positional transfer sensitivity, that has been discussed only in terms of the unidimensional distribution of income. We enrich the literature by adapting such principle to a bidimensional context, in order to provide an alternative framework for those who might be more concerned about di¤erences in the upper part of the distribution rather than in the lower part of it. In particular, we propose di¤erent combinations of upside and dowside inequality aversion referred alternatively to the income and the non-income component, to come up with a complete framework allowing for various possible normative choices. We intoduce three di¤erent third order stochastic dominance conditions, holding for classes of social welfare functions that are built upon such choices.
